FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER & COSTS LESS REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW VICE PRESIDENT AL GORE CONTENTS Cover Letter to the President Preface Introduction Chapter 1 Cutting Red Tape Step 1: Streamlining the Budget Process Step 2: Decentralizing Personnel Policy Step 3: Streamlining Procurement Step 4: Reorienting the Inspectors General Step 5: Eliminating Regulatory Overkill Step 6: Empower State and Local Governments Conclusion Chapter 2 Putting Customers First Step 1: Giving Customers a Voice--And a Choice Step 2: Making Service Organizations Compete Step 3: Creating Market Dynamics Step 4: Using Market Mechanisms to Solve Problems Conclusion Chapter 3 Empowering Employees to Get Results Step 1: Decentralizing Decisionmaking Power Step 2: Hold All Federal Employees Accountable for Results Step 3: Giving Federal Workers the Tools They Need to Do Their Jobs Step 4: Enhancing the Quality of Worklife Step 5: Forming a Labor-Management Partnership Step 6: Exerting Leadership Conclusion Chapter 4 Cutting Back to Basics Step 1: Eliminate What We Don't Need Step 2: Collecting More Step 3: Investing in Greater Productivity Step 4: Reengineering Programs to Cut Costs Conclusion Conclusion Endnotes Appendix A: Major Recommendations by Agency Appendix B: Summary of Savings Appendix C: Major Recommendations Affecting Governmental Systems September 7, 1993 The President The White House Washington, DC Dear Mr. President, The National Performance Review, the intensive, 6-month study of the federal government that you requested, has completed its work. This report represents the beginning of what must be, and--with your leadership--will be, a long-term commitment to change. The title of this report reflects our goals: moving from red tape to results to create a government that works better and costs less. Many talented federal employees contributed to this report, bringing their experience and insight to a difficult and urgent task. We sought ideas and advice from all across America: from other federal workers, from state and local government officials, from management experts, from business leaders, and from private citizens eager for change. This report benefitted greatly from their involvement, and we intend for them to benefit from the reforms we are proposing here. It is your vision of a government that works for people, cleared of useless bureaucracy and waste and freed from red tape and senseless rules, that continues to be the catalyst for our efforts. We present this report to you confident that it will provide an effective and innovative plan to make that vision a reality. Sincerely, Al Gore Vice President FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS PREFACE ______________________________________________________________________ | We can no longer afford to pay more for--and get less from--our | | government. The answer for every problem cannot always be another | | program or more money. It is time to radically change the way the | | government operates--to shift from top-down bureaucracy to | | entrepreneurial government that empowers citizens and communities | | to change our country from the bottom up. We must reward the | | people and ideas that work and get rid of those that don't. | | | | Bill Clinton and Al Gore | | Putting People First1 | ______________________________________________________________________ The National Performance Review is about change--historic change-- in the way the government works. The Clinton administration believes it is time for a new customer service contract with the American people, a new guarantee of effective, efficient, and responsive government. As our title makes clear, the National Performance Review is about moving from red tape to results to create a government that works better and costs less. These are our twin missions: to make government work better and cost less. The President has already addressed the federal deficit with the largest deficit reduction package in history. The National Performance Review can reduce the deficit further, but it is not just about cutting spending. It is also about closing the trust deficit: proving to the American people that their tax dollars will be treated with respect for the hard work that earned them. We are taking action to put America's house in order. The National Performance Review began on March 3, 1993, when President Clinton announced a 6-month review of the federal government and asked me to lead the effort. We organized a team of experienced federal employees from all corners of the government-- a marked change from past efforts, which relied on outsiders. We turned to the people who know government best--who know what works, what doesn't, and how things ought to be changed. We organized these people into a series of teams, to examine both agencies and cross-cutting systems, such as budgeting, procurement, and personnel. The President also asked all cabinet members to create Reinvention Teams to lead transformations at their departments, and Reinvention Laboratories, to begin experimenting with new ways of doing business. Thousands of federal employees joined these two efforts. But the National Performance Review did not stop there. From the beginning, I wanted to hear from as many Americans as possible. I spoke with federal employees at every major agency and at federal centers across the country--seeking their ideas, their input, and their inspiration. I visited programs that work: a Miami school that also serves as a community center, a Minnesota pilot program that provides benefits more efficiently by using technology and debit cards, a Chicago neighborhood that has put community policing to work, a U.S. Air Force base that has made quality management a way of life. We also heard from citizens all across America, in more than 30,000 letters and phone calls. We sought the views of hundreds of different organizations, large and small. We learned from the experience of state and local leaders who have restructured their organizations. And we listened to business leaders who have used innovative management practices to turn their companies around. At a national conference in Tennessee, we brought together experts to explore how best to apply the principles of reinventing government to improving family services. In Philadelphia's Independence Square, where our government was born, we gathered for a day-long "Reinventing Government Summit'' with the best minds from business, government, and the academic community. This report is the first product of our efforts. It describes roughly 100 of our most important actions and recommendations, while hundreds more are listed in the appendices at the end of this report. In the coming months, we will publish additional information providing more detail on those recommendations. This report represents the beginning of what will be--what must be--an ongoing commitment to change. It includes actions that will be taken now, by directive of the President; actions that will be taken by the cabinet secretaries and agency heads; and recommendations for congressional action. The National Performance Review focused primarily on how government should work, not on what it should do. Our job was to improve performance in areas where policymakers had already decided government should play a role. We examined every cabinet department and 10 agencies. At two departments, Defense and Health and Human Services, our work paralleled other large-scale reviews already under way. Defense had launched a Bottom-Up Review to meet the President's 1994-1997 spending reduction target. In addition, comprehensive health and welfare reform task forces had been established to make large-scale changes in significant parts of Health and Human Services. Nevertheless, we made additional recommendations in both these departments and passed other findings on to the relevant task force for review. The National Performance Review recommendations, if enacted, would produce savings of $108 billion over 5 years. As the table below indicates, $36.4 billion of these savings come from specific changes proposed in the agencies and departments of the government. We also expect that the reinventions we propose will allow us to reduce the size of the civilian, non-postal workforce by 12 percent over the next 5 years. This will bring the federal workforce below two million employees for the first time since 1967. This reduction in the workforce will total 252,000 positions--152,000 over and above the 100,000 already promised by President Clinton. Most of the personnel reductions will be concentrated in the structures of over-control and micromanagement that now bind the federal government: supervisors, headquarters staffs, personnel specialists, budget analysts, procurement specialists, accountants, and auditors. These central control structures not only stifle the creativity of line managers and workers, they consume billions per year in salary, benefits, and administrative costs. Additional personnel cuts will result as each agency reengineers its basic work processes to achieve higher productivity at lower costs--eliminating unnecessary layers of management and nonessential staff. We will accomplish as much of this as possible through attrition, early retirement, and a time-limited program of cash incentives to leave federal service. If an employee whose job is eliminated cannot take early retirement and elects not to take a cash incentive to leave government service, we will help that employee find another job offer through out-placement assistance. In addition to savings from the agencies and savings in personnel we expect that systematic reform of the procurement process should reduce the cost of everything the government buys. Our antiquated procurement system costs the government in two ways: first, we pay for all the bureaucracy we have created to buy things, and second, manufacturers build the price of dealing with this bureaucracy into the prices they charge us. If we reform the procurement system, we should be able to save $22 billion over 5 years. As everyone knows, the computer revolution allows us to do things faster and more cheaply than we ever have before. Savings due to consolidation and modernization of the information infrastructure amount to $5.4 billion over 5 years. Finally, by simplifying paperwork and reducing administrative costs, we expect to save $3.3 billion over 5 years in the cost of administering grant programs to state and local governments. Many of the spending cuts we propose can be done by simplifying the internal organization of our departments and agencies. Others will require legislation. We recognize that there is broad support in Congress for both spending cuts and government reforms, and we look forward to working with Congress to pass this package of recommendations. As President Clinton said when he announced the National Performance Review: This performance review is not about politics. Programs passed by both Democratic presidents and Republican presidents, voted on by members of Congress of both parties, and supported by the American people at the time, are being undermined by an inefficient and outdated bureaucracy, and by our huge debt. For too long the basic functioning of the government has gone unexamined. We want to make improving the way government does business a permanent part of how government works, regardless of which party is in power. We have not a moment to lose. President Kennedy once told a story about a French general who asked his gardener to plant a tree. "Oh, this tree grows slowly," the gardener said. "It won't mature for a hundred years." "Then there's no time to lose," the general answered. "Plant it this afternoon." Al Gore Vice President of the United States ______________________________________________________________________ | Clinton/Gore NPR Savings | | (FY-1995-1999 $ in Billions) | | Agencies 36.4 | | Streamlining the Bureaucracy 40.4 | | through Reengineering | | Procurement 22.5 | | 5% annual savings in total | | procurement spending | | | | Information Technology 5.4 | | Savings due to consolidation and | | modernization of the information | | infrastructure | | | | Intergovernmental 3.3 | | Offer fee-for-service option in lieu | | of existing administrative costs | | Total 108 | | (For a fuller description see Appendix A and Appendix B.) | ______________________________________________________________________ FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS INTRODUCTION ______________________________________________________________________ | Our goal is to make the entire federal government both less | | expensive and more efficient, and to change the culture of our | | national bureaucracy away from complacency and entitlement toward | | initiative and empowerment. We intend to redesign, to reinvent, | | to reinvigorate the entire national government." | | | | President Bill Clinton | | Remarks announcing the National Performance Review | | March 3, 1993 | ______________________________________________________________________ Public confidence in the federal government has never been lower. The average American believes we waste 48 cents of every tax dollar. Five of every six want "fundamental change" in Washington. Only 20 percent of Americans trust the federal government to do the right thing most of the time--down from 76 percent 30 years ago.1 We all know why. Washington's failures are large and obvious. For a decade, the deficit has run out of control. The national debt now exceeds $4 trillion--$16,600 for every man, woman, and child in America. But the deficit is only the tip of the iceberg. Below the surface, Americans believe, lies enormous unseen waste. The Defense Department owns more than $40 billion in unnecessary supplies.2 The Internal Revenue Service struggles to collect billions in unpaid bills. A century after industry replaced farming as America's principal business, the Agriculture Department still operates more than 12,000 field service offices, an average of nearly 4 for every county in the nation--rural, urban, or suburban. The federal government seems unable to abandon the obsolete. It knows how to add, but not to subtract. And yet, waste is not the only problem. The federal government is not simply broke; it is broken. Ineffective regulation of the financial industry brought us the savings and loan debacle. Ineffective education and training programs jeopardize our competitive edge. Ineffective welfare and housing programs undermine our families and cities. We spend $25 billion a year on welfare, $27 billion on food stamps, and $13 billion on public housing--yet more Americans fall into poverty every year.3 We spend $12 billion a year waging war on drugs--yet see few signs of victory. We fund 150 different employment and training programs--yet the average American has no idea where to get job training, and the skills of our workforce fall further behind those of our competitors.4 It is almost as if federal programs were designed not to work. In truth, few are "designed" at all; the legislative process simply churns them out, one after another, year after year. It's little wonder that when asked if "government always manages to mess things up," two-thirds of Americans say "yes."5 To borrow the words of a recent Brookings Institution book, we suffer not only a budget deficit but a performance deficit.6 Indeed, public opinion experts argue that we are suffering the deepest crisis of faith in government in our lifetimes. In past crises--Watergate or the Vietnam War, for example--Americans doubted their leaders on moral or ideological grounds. They felt their government was deceiving them or failing to represent their values. Today's crisis is different: people simply feel that government doesn't work.7 In Washington, debate rarely focuses on the performance deficit. Our leaders spend most of their time debating policy issues. But if the vehicle designed to carry out policy is broken, new policies won't take us anywhere. If the car won't run, it hardly matters where we point it; we won't get there. Today, the central issue we face is not what government does, but how it works. ______________________________________________________________________ | We need a federal government that delivers more for less. We need | | a federal government that treats its taxpayers as if they were | | customers and treats taxpayer dollars with respect for the sweat | | and sacrifice that earned them. | | | | Vice President Al Gore | | May 24, 1993 | ______________________________________________________________________ We have spent too much money for programs that don't work. It's time to make our government work for the people, learn to do more with less, and treat taxpayers like customers. President Clinton created the National Performance Review to do just that. In this report we make hundreds of recommendations for actions that, if implemented, will revolutionize the way the federal government does business. They will reduce waste, eliminate unneeded bureaucracy, improve service to taxpayers, and create a leaner but more productive government. As noted in the preface, they can save $108 billion over 5 years if those which will be enacted by the President and his cabinet are added to those we propose for enactment by Congress. Some of these proposals can be enacted by the President and his cabinet, others will require legislative action. We are going to fight for these changes. We are determined to create a government that works better and costs less. A CURE WORSE THAN THE DISEASE Government is not alone in its troubles. As the Industrial Era has given way to the Information Age, institutions--both public and private--have come face to face with obsolescence. The past decade has witnessed profound restructuring: In the 1980s, major American corporations reinvented themselves; in the 1990s, governments are struggling to do the same. In recent years, our national leaders responded to the growing crisis with traditional medicine. They blamed the bureaucrats. They railed against "fraud, waste, and abuse." And they slapped ever more controls on the bureaucracy to prevent it. But the cure has become indistinguishable from the disease. The problem is not lazy or incompetent people; it is red tape and regulation so suffocating that they stifle every ounce of creativity. No one would offer a drowning man a drink of water. And yet, for more than a decade, we have added red tape to a system already strangling in it. The federal government is filled with good people trapped in bad systems: budget systems, personnel systems, procurement systems, financial management systems, information systems. When we blame the people and impose more controls, we make the systems worse. Over the past 15 years, for example, Congress has created within each agency an independent office of the inspector general. The idea was to root out fraud, waste, and abuse. The inspectors general have certainly uncovered important problems. But as we learned in conversation after conversation, they have so intimidated federal employees that many are now afraid to deviate even slightly from standard operating procedure. Yet innovation, by its nature, requires deviation. Unfortunately, faced with so many controls, many employees have simply given up. They do everything by the book--whether it makes sense or not. They fill out forms that should never have been created, follow rules that should never have been imposed, and prepare reports that serve no purpose--and are often never even read. In the name of controlling waste, we have created paralyzing inefficiency. It's time we found a way to get rid of waste and encourage efficiency. THE ROOT PROBLEM: INDUSTRIAL-ERA BUREAUCRACIES IN AN INFORMATION AGE Is government inherently incompetent? Absolutely not. Are federal agencies filled with incompetent people? No. The problem is much deeper: Washington is filled with organizations designed for an environment that no longer exists--bureaucracies so big and wasteful they can no longer serve the American people. From the 1930s through the 1960s, we built large, top-down, centralized bureaucracies to do the public's business. They were patterned after the corporate structures of the age: hierarchical bureaucracies in which tasks were broken into simple parts, each the responsibility of a different layer of employees, each defined by specific rules and regulations. With their rigid preoccupation with standard operating procedure, their vertical chains of command, and their standardized services, these bureaucracies were steady--but slow and cumbersome. And in today's world of rapid change, lightning-quick information technologies, tough global competition, and demanding customers, large, top-down bureaucracies--public or private--don't work very well. Saturn isn't run the way General Motors was. Intel isn't run the way IBM was. ______________________________________________________________________ | Our people, of course, work hard for their money.... They want | | quality in the cars they buy. They want quality in their local | | schools. And they want quality in their federal government and in | | federal programs. | | | | Senator John Glenn | | Remarks introducing a hearing on federal planning and performance | | May 5, 1992 | ______________________________________________________________________ Many federal organizations are also monopolies, with few incentives to innovate or improve. Employees have virtual lifetime tenure, regardless of their performance. Success offers few rewards; failure, few penalties. And customers are captive; they can't walk away from the air traffic control system or the Internal Revenue Service and sign up with a competitor. Worse, most federal monopolies receive their money without any direct input from their customers. Consequently, they try a lot harder to please Congressional appropriations subcommittees than the people they are meant to serve. Taxpayers pay more than they should and get poorer service. Politics intensifies the problem. In Washington's highly politicized world, the greatest risk is not that a program will perform poorly, but that a scandal will erupt. Scandals are front- page news, while routine failure is ignored. Hence control system after control system is piled up to minimize the risk of scandal. The budget system, the personnel rules, the procurement process, the inspectors general--all are designed to prevent the tiniest misstep. We assume that we can't trust employees to make decisions, so we spell out in precise detail how they must do virtually everything, then audit them to ensure that they have obeyed every rule. The slightest deviation prompts new regulations and even more audits. Before long, simple procedures are too complex for employees to navigate, so we hire more budget analysts, more personnel experts, and more procurement officers to make things work. By then, the process involves so much red tape that the smallest action takes far longer and costs far more than it should. Simple travel arrangements require endless forms and numerous signatures. Straightforward purchases take months; larger ones take years. Routine printing jobs can take dozens of approvals. This emphasis on process steals resources from the real job: serving the customer. Indeed, the federal government spends billions paying people who control, check up on, or investigate others--supervisors, headquarters staffs, budget officers, personnel officers, procurement officers, and staffs of the General Accounting Office (GAO) and the inspectors general.8 Not all this money is wasted, of course. But the real waste is no doubt larger, because the endless regulations and layers of control consume every employee's time. Who pays? The taxpayer. ______________________________________________________________________ | During Vice President Gore's town hall meeting with employees of | | the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the | | following exchange took place: | | | | Participant: We had an article in our newsletter several months | | ago that said--the lead story was "I'd rather have a lobotomy | | than have another idea." And that was reflecting the problem of | | our Ideas Program here in HUD. | | | | Many of the employees have wonderful ideas about how to save money | | and so on, but the way it works is that it has to be approved by | | the supervisor and the supervisor's supervisor and the | | supervisor's supervisor's supervisor before it ever gets to the | | Ideas Program ... | | | | Many of the supervisors feel threatened because they didn't think | | of this idea, and this money is wasted in their office, and they | | didn't believe or didn't know it was happening and didn't catch | | it. So they are threatened and feel that it will make them look | | bad if they recognize the idea. | | | | Vice President Gore: So they strangle that idea in the crib, don't | | they? Participant: And then they strangle the person that had the | | idea. | | | | Participant: And then they strangle the person that had the idea. | ______________________________________________________________________ Consider but one example, shared with Vice President Gore at a meeting of federal employees in Atlanta. After federal marshals seize drug dealers' homes, they are allowed to sell them and use the money to help finance the war on drugs. To sell the houses, they must keep them presentable, which includes keeping the lawns mowed. In Atlanta, the employee explained, most organizations would hire neighborhood teenagers to mow a lawn for $10. But procurement regulations require the U.S. Marshals Service to bid out all work competitively, and neighborhood teenagers don't compete for contracts. So the federal government pays $40 a lawn to professional landscape firms. Regulations designed to save money waste it, because they take decisions out of the hands of those responsible for doing the work. And taxpayers lose $30 for every lawn mowed. What would happen if the marshals used their common sense and hired neighborhood teenagers? Someone would notice--perhaps the Washington office, perhaps the inspector general's office, perhaps even the GAO. An investigation might well follow--hindering a career or damaging a reputation. In this way, federal employees quickly learn that common sense is risky--and creativity is downright dangerous. They learn that the goal is not to produce results, please customers, or save taxpayers' money, but to avoid mistakes. Those who dare to innovate do so quietly. This is perhaps the saddest lesson learned by those who worked on the National Performance Review: Yes, innovators exist within the federal government, but many work hard to keep their innovations quiet. By its nature, innovation requires a departure from standard operating procedure. In the federal government, such departures invite repercussions. The result is a culture of fear and resignation. To survive, employees keep a low profile. They decide that the safest answer in any given situation is a firm "maybe." They follow the rules, pass the buck, and keep their heads down. They develop what one employee, speaking with Vice President Gore at a Department of Veterans Affairs meeting, called "a government attitude." THE SOLUTION: CREATING ENTREPRENEURIAL ORGANIZATIONS How do we solve these problems? It won't be easy. We know all about government's problems, but little about solutions. The National Performance Review began by compiling a comprehensive list of problems. We had the GAO's 28-volume report on federal management problems, published last fall. We had GAO's High-Risk Series, a 17-volume series of pamphlets on troubled programs and agencies. We had the House Government Operations Committee's report on federal mismanagement, called Managing the Federal Government: A Decade of Decline. And we had 83 notebooks summarizing just the tables of contents of reports published by the inspectors general, the Congressional Budget Office, the agencies, and think tanks. Unfortunately, few of these studies helped us design solutions. Few of the investigating bodies had studied success stories-- organizations that had solved their problems. And without studying success, it is hard to devise real solutions. For years, the federal government has studied failure, and for years, failure has endured. Six of every ten major agencies have programs on the Office of Management and Budget's "high-risk" list, meaning they carry a significant risk of runaway spending or fraud. The National Performance Review approached its task differently. Not only did we look for potential savings and efficiencies, we searched for success. We looked for organizations that produced results, satisfied customers, and increased productivity. We looked for organizations that constantly learned, innovated, and improved. We looked for effective, entrepreneurial public organizations. And we found them: in local government, in state government, in other countries--and right here in our federal government. At the Air Combat Command, for example, we found units that had doubled their productivity in 5 years. Why? Because the command measured performance everywhere; squadrons and bases competed proudly for the best maintenance, flight, and safety records; and top management had empowered employees to strip away red tape and redesign work processes. A supply system that had once required 243 entries by 22 people on 13 forms to get one spare part into an F-15 had been radically simplified and decentralized. Teams of employees were saving millions of dollars by moving supply operations to the front line, developing their own flight schedules, and repairing parts that were once discarded.9 At the Internal Revenue Service, we found tax return centers competing for the best productivity records. Performance on key customer service criteria--such as the accuracy of answers provided to taxpayers--had improved dramatically. Utah's Ogden Service Center, to cite but one example, had more than 50 "productivity improvement teams" simplifying forms and reengineering work processes. Not only had employees saved more than $11 million, they had won the 1992 Presidential Award for Quality.10 At the Forest Service, we found a pilot project in the 22-state Eastern Region that had increased productivity by 15 percent in just 2 years. The region had simplified its budget systems, eliminated layers of middle management, pared central headquarters staff by a fifth, and empowered front-line employees to make their own decisions. At the Mark Twain National Forest, for instance, the time needed to grant a grazing permit had shrunk from 30 days to a few hours--because employees could grant permits themselves rather than process them through headquarters.11 We discovered that several other governments were also reinventing themselves, from Australia to Great Britain, Singapore to Sweden, the Netherlands to New Zealand. Throughout the developed world, the needs of information-age societies were colliding with the limits of industrial-era government. Regardless of party, regardless of ideology, these governments were responding. In Great Britain, conservatives led the way. In New Zealand, the Labor Party revolutionized government. In Australia and Sweden, both conservative and liberal parties embraced fundamental change. In the United States, we found the same phenomenon at the state and local levels. The movement to reinvent government is as bipartisan as it is widespread. It is driven not by political ideology, but by absolute necessity. Governors, mayors, and legislators of both parties have reached the same conclusion: Government is broken, and it is time to fix it. Where we found success, we found many common characteristics. Early on, we articulated these in a one-page statement of our commitment. In organizing this report, we have boiled these characteristics down to four key principles. 1. CUTTING RED TAPE Effective, entrepreneurial governments cast aside red tape, shifting from systems in which people are accountable for following rules to systems in which they are accountable for achieving results. They streamline their budget, personnel, and procurement systems--liberating organizations to pursue their missions. They reorient their control systems to prevent problems rather than simply punish those who make mistakes. They strip away unnecessary layers of regulation that stifle innovation. And they deregulate organizations that depend upon them for funding, such as lower levels of government. 2. PUTTING CUSTOMERS FIRST Effective, entrepreneurial governments insist on customer satisfaction. They listen carefully to their customers--using surveys, focus groups, and the like. They restructure their basic operations to meet customers' needs. And they use market dynamics such as competition and customer choice to create incentives that drive their employees to put customers first. By "customer," we do not mean "citizen." A citizen can participate in democratic decisionmaking; a customer receives benefits from a specific service. All Americans are citizens. Most are also customers: of the U.S. Postal Service, the Social Security Administration, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the National Park Service, and scores of other federal organizations. In a democracy, citizens and customers both matter. But when they vote, citizens seldom have much chance to influence the behavior of public institutions that directly affect their lives: schools, hospitals, farm service agencies, social security offices. It is a sad irony: citizens own their government, but private businesses they do not own work much harder to cater to their needs. 3. EMPOWERING EMPLOYEES TO GET RESULTS Effective, entrepreneurial governments transform their cultures by decentralizing authority. They empower those who work on the front lines to make more of their own decisions and solve more of their own problems. They embrace labor-management cooperation, provide training and other tools employees need to be effective, and humanize the workplace. While stripping away layers and empowering front-line employees, they hold organizations accountable for producing results. 4. CUTTING BACK TO BASICS: PRODUCING BETTER GOVERNMENT FOR LESS Effective, entrepreneurial governments constantly find ways to make government work better and cost less--reengineering how they do their work and reexamining programs and processes. They abandon the obsolete, eliminate duplication, and end special interest privileges. They invest in greater productivity, through loan funds and long-term capital investments. And they embrace advanced technologies to cut costs. These are the bedrock principles on which the reinvention of the federal bureaucracy must build--and the principles around which we have organized our actions. They fit together much like the pieces of a puzzle: if one is missing, the others lose their power. To create organizations that deliver value to American taxpayers, we must embrace all four. Our approach goes far beyond fixing specific problems in specific agencies. Piecemeal efforts have been under way for years, but they have not delivered what Americans demand. The failure in Washington is embedded in the very systems by which we organize the federal bureaucracy. In recent years, Congress has taken the lead in reinventing these systems. In 1990, it passed the Chief Financial Officers Act, designed to overhaul financial management systems; in July 1993, it passed the Government Performance and Results Act, which will introduce performance measurement throughout the federal government. With Congress's leadership, we hope to reinvent government's other basic systems, such as budget, personnel, information, and procurement. ______________________________________________________________________ | Americans voted for a change last November. They want better | | schools and health care and better roads and more jobs, but they | | want us to do it all with a government that works better on less | | money and that is more responsive. | | | | President Bill Clinton | | Remarks announcing the National Performance Review | | March 3, 1993 | ______________________________________________________________________ Our approach has much in common with other management philosophies, such as quality management and business process reengineering. But these management disciplines were developed for the private sector, where conditions are quite different. In business, red tape may be bad, but it is not the suffocating presence it is in government. In business, market incentives already exist; no one need invent them. Powerful incentives are always at work, forcing organizations to do more with less. Indeed, businesses that fail to increase their productivity--or that tie themselves up in red tape--shrink or die. Hence, private sector management doctrines tend to overlook some central problems of government: its monopolies, its lack of a bottom line, its obsession with process rather than results. Consequently, our approach goes beyond private sector methods. It is aimed at the heart and soul of government. The National Performance Review also shares certain goals with past efforts to cut costs in government. But our mission goes beyond cost-cutting. Our goal is not simply to weed the federal garden; it is to create a regimen that will keep the garden free of weeds. It is not simply to trim pieces of government, but to reinvent the way government does everything. It is not simply to produce a more efficient government, but to create a more effective one. After all, Americans don't want a government that fails more efficiently. They want a government that works. To deliver what the people want, we need not jettison the traditional values that underlie democratic governance--values such as equal opportunity, justice, diversity, and democracy. We hold these values dear. We seek to transform bureaucracies precisely because they have failed to nurture these values. We believe that those who resist change for fear of jeopardizing our democratic values doom us to a government that continues--through its failures--to subvert those very values. ______________________________________________________________________ | PRINCIPLES OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW | | | | We will invent a government that puts people first, by: | | * Cutting unnecessary spending | | * Serving its customers | | * Empowering its employees | | * Helping communities solve their own problems | | * Fostering excellence | | | | Here's how. We will: | | * Create a clear sense of mission | | * Steer more, row less | | * Delegate authority and responsibility | | * Replace regulations with incentives | | * Develop budgets based on outcomes | | * Expose federal operations to competition | | * Search for market, not administrative, solutions | | * Measure our success by customer satisfaction | ______________________________________________________________________ OUR COMMITMENT: A LONG-TERM INVESTMENT IN CHANGE This is not the first time Americans have felt compelled to reinvent their government. In 1776, our founding fathers rejected the old model of a central power issuing edicts for all to obey. In its place, they created a government that broadly distributed power. Their vision of democracy, which gave citizens a voice in managing the United States, was untried and untested in 1776. It required a tremendous leap of faith. But it worked. Later generations extended this experiment in democracy to those not yet enfranchised. As the 20th century dawned, a generation of "Progressives" such as Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson invented the modern bureaucratic state, designed to meet the needs of a new industrial society. Franklin Roosevelt brought it to full flower. Indeed, Roosevelt's 1937 announcement of his Committee on Administrative Management sounds as if it were written today: The time has come to set our house in order. The administrative management of the government needs overhauling. The executive structure of the government is sadly out of date .... If we have faith in our republican form of government ... we must devote ourselves energetically and courageously to the task of making that government efficient. Through the ages, public management has tended to follow the prevailing paradigm of private management. The 1930s were no exception. Roosevelt's committee--and the two Hoover commissions that followed--recommended a structure patterned largely after those of corporate America in the 1930s. In a sense, they brought to government the GM model of organization. By the 1980s, even GM recognized that this model no longer worked. When it created Saturn, its first new division in 67 years, GM embraced a very different model. It picked its best and brightest and asked them to create a more entrepreneurial organization, with fewer layers, fewer rules, and employees empowered to do whatever was necessary to satisfy the customer. Faced with the very real threat of bankruptcy, major American corporations have revolutionized the way they do business. Confronted with our twin budget and performance deficits--which so undermine public trust in government--President Clinton intends to do the same thing. He did not staff the Performance Review primarily with outside consultants or corporate experts, as past presidents have. Instead, he chose federal employees to take the lead. They consulted with experts from state government, local government, and the private sector. But as Vice President Gore said over and over at his meetings with federal employees: "The people who work closest to the problem know the most about how to solve the problem." Nor did the effort stop with the men and women who staffed the Performance Review. President Clinton asked every cabinet member to create a Reinvention Team to redesign his or her department, and Reinvention Laboratories to begin experimenting immediately. Since April, people all across our government have been working full time to reinvent the federal bureaucracy. The process is not easy, nor will it be quick. There are changes we can make immediately, but even if all of our actions are enacted, we will only have begun to reinvent the federal government. Our efforts are but a down payment--the first installment of a long-term investment in change. Every expert with whom we talked reminded us that change takes time. In a large corporation, transformation takes 6 to 8 years at best. In the federal government, which has more than 7 times as many employees as America's largest corporation, it will undoubtedly take longer to bring about the historic changes we propose.12 Along the way, we will make mistakes. Some reforms will succeed beyond our wildest dreams; others will not. As in any experimental process, we will need to monitor results and correct as we go. But we must not confuse mistakes with failure. As Tom Peters and Robert Waterman wrote in In Search of Excellence, any organization that is not making mistakes is not trying hard enough. Babe Ruth, the Sultan of Swat, struck out 1,330 times. With this report, then, we begin a decade-long process of reinvention. We hope this process will involve not only the thousands of federal employees now at work on Reinvention Teams and in Reinvention Labs, but millions more who are not yet engaged. We hope it will transform the habits, culture, and performance of all federal organizations. ______________________________________________________________________ | I would invite those who are cynical about the possibility of this | | change to ask themselves this question: What would your reaction | | have been 10 years ago if someone had said that in the summer of | | 1993 American automobile companies would be making the highest | | quality, most competitively priced cars in the world? I know my | | reaction would have been, "No way. I am sorry, but I've bought too | | many clunkers. They can't do it. The momentum toward mediocrity is | | just too powerful." But that change has taken place. And if an | | industry as large and as stodgy as the automobile industry can | | undergo that kind of transformation, then the federal government | | can as well. | | | | Vice President Al Gore | | Town Hall Meeting, | | Department of Energy | | July 13, 1993 | ______________________________________________________________________ Some may say that the task is too large; that we should not attempt it because we are bound to make mistakes; that it cannot be done. But we have no choice. Our government is in trouble. It has lost its sense of mission; it has lost its ethic of public service; and, most importantly, it has lost the faith of the American people. In times such as these, the most dangerous course is to do nothing. We must have the courage to risk change. FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS CHAPTER 1: CUTTING RED TAPE ______________________________________________________________________ | About 10 years ago, two foresters returned from a hard day in the | | field to make plans for the coming week. Searching for a detail of | | agency policy, they found themselves overwhelmed by voluminous | | editions of policy manuals, reports, and binders filled with | | thousands of directives. One forester recalled the very first | | Forest Service manual--small enough to fit into every ranger's | | shirt pocket, yet containing everything foresters needed to know | | to do their jobs. | | | | "Why is it that when we have a problem," the other forester asked, | | "the solution is always to add something--a report, a system, a | | policy--but never take something away?" | | | | The first replied: "What if... we could just start over?" 1 | ______________________________________________________________________ The federal government does at least one thing well: It generates red tape. But not one inch of that red tape appears by accident. In fact, the government creates it all with the best of intentions. It is time now to put aside our reverence for those good intentions and examine what they have created--a system that makes it hard for our civil servants to do what we pay them for, and frustrates taxpayers who rightfully expect their money's worth. Because we don't want politicians' families, friends, and supporters placed in "no-show" jobs, we have more than 100,000 pages of personnel rules and regulations defining in exquisite detail how to hire, promote, or fire federal employees.2 Because we don't want employees or private companies profiteering from federal contracts, we create procurement processes that require endless signatures and long months to buy almost anything. Because we don't want agencies using tax dollars for any unapproved purpose, we dictate precisely how much they can spend on everything from staff to telephones to travel. And because we don't want state and local governments using federal funds for purposes that Congress did not intend, we write regulations telling them exactly how to run most programs that receive federal funds. We call for their partnership in dealing with our country's most urgent domestic problems, yet we do not treat them as equal partners. Consider some examples from the daily lives of federal workers, people for whom red tape means being unable to do their jobs as well as they can--or as well as we deserve. The district managers of Oregon's million-acre Ochoco National Forest have 53 separate budgets--one for fence maintenance, one for fence construction, one for brush burning--divided into 557 management codes and 1,769 accounting lines. To transfer money between accounts, they need approval from headquarters. They estimate the task of tracking spending in each account consumes at least 30 days of their time every year, days they could spend doing their real jobs.3 It also sends a message: You are not trusted with even the simplest responsibilities. Or consider the federal employees who repair cars and trucks at naval bases. Each time they need a spare part, they order it through a central purchasing office--a procedure that can keep vehicles in the shop for a month. This keeps one-tenth of the fleet out of commission, so the Navy buys 10 percent more vehicles than it needs.4 Or how about the new Energy Department petroleum engineer who requested a specific kind of calculator to do her job? Three months later, she received an adding machine. Six months after that, the procurement office got her a calculator--a tiny, hand-held model that could not perform the complex calculations her work required. Disgusted, she bought her own.5 Federal managers read the same books and attend the same conferences as private sector managers. They know what good management looks like. They just can't put it into practice-- because they face constraints few managers in the private sector could imagine. Hamstrung by rules and regulations, federal managers simply do not have the power to shape their organizations enjoyed by private sector managers. Their job is to make sure that every dollar is spent in the budget category and the year for which it was appropriated, that every promotion is consistent with central guidelines, and that every piece of equipment is bought through competitive bidding. In an age of personal computers, they are asked to write with quill pens. ______________________________________________________________________ | Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what you want to | | achieve, and they will surprise you with their ingenuity. | | | | General George S. Patton | | 1944 | ______________________________________________________________________ This thicket of rules and regulations has layer upon layer of additional oversight. Each new procedure necessitates someone's approval. The result is fewer people doing real work, more people getting in their way. As management sage Peter Drucker once said, "So much of what we call management consists of making it difficult for people to work."6 As Robert Tobias, president of the National Treasury Employees Union, told participants at the Philadelphia Summit on Reinventing Government, "The regulations and statutes that bind federal employees from exercising discretion available in the private sector all come about as a response to the humiliations, mistakes, embarrassments of the past." Even though, as Tobias noted, "those problems are 15, 20, 30 years old," and "the regulations and the statutes don't change." The need to enforce the regulations and statutes, in turn, creates needless layers of bureaucracy. The layers begin with "staff" agencies, such as the General Services Administration (GSA) and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). These staff agencies were designed originally to provide specialized support for "line" agencies, such as the Interior and Commerce departments, that do government's real work. But as rules and regulations began to proliferate, support turned into control. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) which serves the President in the budget process, runs more than 50 compliance, clearance, and review processes. Some of this review is necessary to ensure budget control and consistency of agency actions--with each other and with the President's program--but much of it is overkill. Line agencies then wrap themselves in even more red tape by creating their own budget offices, personnel offices, and procurement offices. Largely in response to appropriations committees, budget offices divide congressional budgets into increasingly tiny line items. A few years ago, for example, base managers in one branch of the military had 26 line items for housing repairs alone.7 Personnel offices tell managers when they can and cannot promote, reward, or move employees. And procurement offices force managers to buy through a central monopoly, precluding agencies from getting what they need, when they need it. What the staff agencies don't control, Congress does. Congressional appropriations often come with hundreds of strings attached. The Interior Department found that language in its 1992 House, Senate, and conference committee reports included some 2,150 directives, earmarks, instructions, and prohibitions.8 As the federal budget tightens, lawmakers request increasingly specific report language to protect activities in their districts. Indeed, 1993 was a record year for such requests. In one appropriations bill alone, senators required the U.S. Customs Service to add new employees to its Honolulu office, prohibited closing any small or rural post office or U.S. Forest Service offices; and forbade the U.S. Mint and the Bureau of Engraving and Printing from even studying the idea of contracting out guard duties. Even worse, Congress often gives a single agency multiple missions, some of which are contradictory. The Agency for International Development has more than 40 different objectives, disposing of American farm surpluses, building democratic institutions, and even strengthening the American land grant college system.9 No wonder it has trouble accomplishing its real mission--promoting international development. In Washington, we must work together to untangle the knots of red tape that prevent government from serving the American people well. We must give cabinet secretaries, program directors and line managers much greater authority to pursue their real purposes. As Theodore Roosevelt said: "The best executive is the one who has the sense to pick good men to do what he wants done, and self- restraint enough to keep from meddling with them while they do it." Our path is clear: We must shift from systems that hold people accountable for process to systems that hold them accountable for results. We discuss accountability for results in chapter 3. In this chapter, we focus on six steps necessary to strip away the red tape that so engulfs our federal employees and frustrates the American people. First, we will streamline the budget process, to remove the manifold restrictions that consume managers' time and literally force them to waste money. Second, we will decentralize personnel policy, to give managers the tools they need to manage effectively--the authority to hire, promote, reward, and fire. Third, we will streamline procurement, to reduce the enormous waste built into the process we use to buy $200 billion a year in goods and services. Fourth, we will reorient the inspectors general, to shift their focus from punishing those who violate rules and regulations to helping agencies learn to perform better. Fifth, we will eliminate thousands of other regulations that hamstring federal employees, to cut the final Lilliputian ropes on the federal giant. Finally, we will deregulate state and local governments, to empower them to spend more time meeting customer needs-- particularly with their 600 federal grant programs--and less time jumping through bureaucratic hoops. As we pare down the systems of over-control and micromanagement in government, we must also pare down the structures that go with them: the oversized headquarters, multiple layers of supervisors and auditors, and offices specializing in the arcane rules of budgeting, personnel, procurement, and finance. We cannot entirely do without headquarters, supervisors, auditors, or specialists, but these structures have grown twice as large as they should be. Counting all personnel, budget, procurement, accounting, auditing, and headquarters staff, plus supervisory personnel in field offices, there are roughly 700,000 federal employees whose job it is to manage, control, check up on or audit others.10 This is one third of all federal civilian employees. Not counting the suffocating impact these management control structures have on line managers and workers, they consume $35 billion a year in salary and benefits alone.11 If Congress enacts the management reforms outlined in this report, we will dramatically cut the cost of these structures. We will reinvest some of the savings in the new management tools we need, including performance measurement, quality management, and training. Overall, these reforms will result in the net elimination of approximately 252,000 positions. (This will include the 100,000 position reduction the President has already set in motion.) A reduction of 252,000 positions will reduce the civilian, non- postal work force by almost 12 percent--bringing it below two million for the first time since the 1966.12 This reduction, targeted at the structures of control and micromanagement, is designed to improve working conditions for the average federal employee. We cannot empower employees to give us their best work unless we eliminate much of the red tape that now prevents it. We will do everything in the government's power to ease the transition for workers, whether they choose to stay with government, retire, or move to the private sector. Our commitment is this: If an employee whose job is eliminated cannot retire through our early retirement program, and does not elect to take a cash incentive to leave government service, we will help that employee find another job offer, either with government or in the private sector. Normal attrition will contribute to the reduction. In addition, we will introduce legislation to permit all agencies to offer cash payments to those who leave federal service voluntarily, whether by retirement or resignation. The Department of Defense (DOD) and intelligence community already have this "buy-out" authority; we will ask Congress to extend it to all agencies. We will also give agencies broad authority to offer early retirement and to expand their retraining, out-placement efforts, and other tools as necessary to accomplish the 12% reduction. Agencies will be able to use these tools as long as they meet their cost reduction targets. These options will give federal managers the same tools commonly used to downsize private businesses. Even with these investments, the downsizing we propose will save the taxpayer billions over the next 5 years. None of this will be easy. Downsizing never is. But the result will not only be a smaller workforce, it will also be a more empowered, more inspired, and more productive workforce. As one federal employee told Vice President Gore at one of his many town meetings, "If you always do what you've always done, you'll always get what you always got." We can no longer afford to get what we've always got. FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS CHAPTER 1: CUTTING RED TAPE STEP 1: STREAMLINING THE BUDGET PROCESS Most people can't get excited about the federal budget process, with its green-eyeshade analysts, complicated procedures, byzantine language, and reams of minutiae. Beyond such elements, however, lies a basic, unalterable reality. For organizations of all kinds, nothing is more important than the process of resource allocation: what goal is sought, how much money they have, what strings are attached to it, and what hurdles are placedble reality. For organizations of all kinds, nothing is more important than the process of resource allocation: what goal is sought, how much money they have, what strings are attached to it, and what hurdles are placed before managers who must spend it. In government, budgeting is never easy. After all, the budget is the most political of documents. If, as the political scientist Harold D. Lasswell once said, politics is "who gets what, when, how," the budget answers that question.13 By crafting a budget, public officials decide who pays what taxes and who receives what benefits. The public's largesse to children, the elderly, the poor, the middle class, and others is shaped by the budgets that support cities, states, and the federal government. But if budgeting is inherently messy, such messiness is costly. Optimally, the budget would be more than the product of struggles among competing interests. It also would reflect the thoughtful planning of our public leaders. No one can improve quality and cut costs without planning to do so. Unfortunately, the most deliberate planning is often subordinated to politics, and is perhaps the last thing we do in constructing a budget. Consider our process. Early in the year, each agency estimates what it will need to run its programs in the fiscal year that begins almost 2 years later. This is like asking someone to figure out not only what they will be doing, but how much it will cost 3 years later--since that's when the money will be spent. Bureau and program managers typically examine the previous year's activity data and project the figures 3 years out, with no word from top political leaders on their priorities, or even on the total amount that they want to spend. In other words, planning budgets is like playing "pin the tail on the donkey." Blindfolded managers are asked to hit an unknown target. OMB, acting for the President, then crafts a proposed budget through back-and forth negotiations with departments and agencies, still a year before the fiscal year it will govern. Decisions are struck on dollars--dollars that, to agencies, mean people, equipment, and everything else they need for their jobs. OMB's examiners may question agency staff as they develop options papers, OMB's director considers the options during his Director's Review meetings, OMB "passes back" recommended funding levels for the agencies, and final figures are worked out during a final appeals process. Early the next year, the President presents a budget proposal to Congress for the fiscal year beginning the following October 1. Lawmakers, the media, and interest groups pore over the document, searching for winners and losers, new spending proposals, and changes in tax laws. In the ensuing months, Congress puts its own stamp on the plan. Although House and Senate budget committees, guide Congress' action, every committee plays a role. Authorizing committees debate the merits of existing programs and the President's proposals for changes within their subject areas. While they decide which programs should continue and recommend funding levels, separate appropriations committees draft the 13 annual spending bills that actually comprise the budget. Congressional debates over a budget resolution, authorization bills, and appropriations drag on, often into the fall. Frequently the President and Congress don't finish by October 1, so Congress passes one or more "continuing resolutions" to keep the money flowing, often at the previous year's level. Until the end, agency officials troop back and forth to OMB and to the Hill to make their case. States and localities, organizations and advocates seek time to argue their cause. Budget staffs work non-stop, preparing estimates and projections on how this or that change will affect revenues or spending. All this work is focused on making a budget--not planning or delivering programs. IRONIES RIDDLE THE PROCESS. * Uncertainty reigns: Although they begin calculating their budget 2 years ahead, agency officials do not always know by October 1 how much they will have to spend and frequently don't even receive their money until well into the fiscal year. * OMB is especially prone to question unspent funds--and reduce the ensuing year's budget by that amount. Agency officials inflate their estimates, driving budget numbers higher and higher. One bureau budget director claims that many regularly ask for 90 percent more than they eventually receive. * Despite months of debate, Congress compresses its actual decision-making on the budget into such a short time frame that many of the public's highest priorities--what to do about drug addiction, for example, or how to prepare workers for jobs in the 21st century--are discussed only briefly, if at all. * The process is devoid of the most useful information. We do not know what last year's money, or that of the year before, actually accomplished. Agency officials devise their funding requests based on what they got before, not whether it produced results. ______________________________________________________________________ | There are two ways to reduce expenditures. There is the | | intelligent way...going through each department and questioning | | each program. Then there is the stupid way: announcing how much | | you will cut and getting each department to cut that amount. I | | favor the stupid way. | | | | Michel Belanger Chairman, Quebec National Bank | | May 7, 1992 | ______________________________________________________________________ In sum, the budget process is characterized by fictional requests and promises, an obsession with inputs rather than outcomes, and a shortage of debate about critical national needs. We must start to plan strategically--linking our spending with priorities and performance. First, we must create a rational budgeting system. Action: The President should begin the budget process with an executive budget resolution, setting broad policy priorities and allocating funds by function for each agency.14 Federal managers should focus primarily on the content of the budget, not on the process. A new executive budget resolution will help them do that. The President should issue a directive in early 1994 to mandate the use of such a resolution in developing his fiscal year 1996 budget. It will turn the executive budget process upside down. To develop the resolution, officials from the White House policy councils will meet with OMB and agency officials. In those sessions, the administration's policy leadership will make decisions on overall spending and revenue levels, deficit reduction targets, and funding allocations for major inter-agency policy initiatives. The product of these meetings--a resolution completed by August--will provide agencies with funding ceilings and allocations for major policy missions. Then, bureaus will generate their own budget estimates, now knowing their agency's priorities and fiscal limits. Our own Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) tried a similar approach in the 1970s as part of a zero-based budgeting trial run. Although zero-based budgeting fell short, participants said, two important advantages emerged: a new responsiveness to internal customer needs and a commitment to final decisions. When participants voted to cut research and development funds because they felt researchers ignored program needs, researchers began asking programs managers what kind of research would support their efforts. EPA also found that, after its leaders had agonized over funding, they remained committed to common decisions. Critics may view the executive budget resolution process as a top- down tool that will stifle creative, bottom-up suggestions for funding options. We think otherwise. The resolution will render top officials responsible for budget totals and policy decisions, but will encourage lower-level ingenuity to devise funding options within those guidelines. By adopting this plan, we will help discourage non-productive micro-management by senior department and agency officials. ACTION: Institute biennial budgets and appropriations.15 We should not have to enact a budget every year. Twenty states adopt budgets for 2 years. (They retain the power to make small adjustments in off years if revenues or expenditures deviate widely from forecasts). As a result, their governors and legislatures have much more time to evaluate programs and develop longer-term plans. Annual budgets consume an enormous amount of management time--time not spent serving customers. With biennial budgets, rather than losing months to a frantic "last-year's budget-plus-X-percent" exercise, we might spend more time examining which programs actually work. The idea of biennial budgeting has been around for some time. Congressman Leon Panetta, now OMB director, introduced the first biennial budgeting bill in 1977, and dozens have been offered since. Although none have passed, the government has some experience with budget plans that cover 2 years or more. In 1987, the President and Congress drafted a budget plan for fiscal years 1988 and 1989 that set spending levels for major categories, enabling Congress to enact all 13 appropriations bills on time for the first time since 1977. In addition, Congress directed the Defense Department to submit a biennial budget for fiscal 1988 and 1989 to give Congress more time for broad policy oversight. At the time, Congress asserted that a biennial budget would "substantially improve DOD management and congressional oversight," and that a two-year DOD budget was an important step toward across-the-board biennial budgeting. Administrations have continued to submit biennial budgets for DOD. The 1990 Budget Enforcement Act and the 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act set 5-year spending limits for discretionary spending and pay-as-you-go requirements for mandatory programs. With these multi-year caps in place, neither the President nor Congress has to decide the total level of discretionary spending each year. These caps provide even more reason for biennial budgets and appropriations. In Congress, 7 out of 10 members favor a biennial process with a 2-year budget resolution and multi-year authorizations. The time is ripe. We recommend that Congress establish biennial budget resolutions and appropriations and multi-year authorizations. The first biennium should begin October 1, 1996, to cover fiscal years 1997 and 1998. After that, bienniums would begin October 1 of each even-numbered year. Such timing would allow President Clinton to develop the first comprehensive biennial federal budget, built on the new executive budget resolution. In off years, the President would submit only amendments for exceptional areas of concern, emergencies, or other unforeseen circumstances. Biennial budgeting will not make our budget decisions easier, for they are shaped by competing interests and priorities. But it will eliminate an enormous amount of busy work that keeps us from evaluating programs and meeting customer needs. ACTION: OMB, departments, and agencies will minimize budget restrictions such as apportionments and allotments.16 Congress typically divides its appropriations into more than 1,000 accounts. Committee reports specify thousands of other restrictions on using money. OMB apportions each account by quarter or year, and sometimes divides it into sub-accounts by line-item or object class--all to control over-spending. Departmental budget offices further divide the money into allotments. Thus, many managers find their money fenced into hundreds of separate accounts. In some agencies, they can move funds among accounts. In others, Congress or the agency limits the transfer of funds, trapping the money. When that happens, managers must spend money where they have it, not where they need it. On one military base, for example, managers had no line item to purchase snowplow equipment, but they did have a maintenance account. When the snowplow broke down they leased one, using the maintenance account. Unfortunately, the 1-year lease cost $100,000--the same as the full purchase price. Such stories are a dime a dozen within the federal bureaucracy. (They may be the only government cost that is coming down.) Good managers struggle to make things work, but, trapped by absurd constraints, they are driven to waste billions of dollars every year. Stories about the legendary end-of-the-year spending rush also abound. Managers who don't exhaust each line item at year's end usually are told to return the excess. Typically, they get less the next time around. The result: the well-known spending frenzy. The National Performance Review received more examples of this source of waste--in letters, in calls, and at town meetings--than any other. Most managers know how to save 5 or 10 percent of what they spend. But knowing they will get less money next year, they have little reason to save. Instead, smart managers spend every penny of every line item. Edwin G. Fleming, chief of the Resources Management Division of the Internal Revenue Service's Cleveland District, put it well in a letter to the Treasury Department's Reinvention Team: Every manager has saved money, only to have his allocation reduced in the subsequent year. This usually happens only once, then the manager becomes a spender rather than a planner. Managing becomes watching after little pots of money that can't be put where it makes business sense because of reprogramming restrictions. So managers, who are monitors of these little pots of money, are rewarded for the ability to maneuver, however limitedly, through the baroque and bizarre world of federal finance and procurement. Solutions to these problems exist. They have been tested in local governments, in state governments, even in the federal government. Essentially, they involve budget systems with fewer line items, more authority for managers to move money among line items, and freedom for agencies to keep some or all of what they save--thus minimizing the incentive for year-end spending sprees. Typically, federal organizations experimenting with such budgets have found that they can achieve better productivity, sometimes with less money. During an experiment at Oregon's Ochoco National Forest in the 1980s, when dozens of accounts were reduced to six, productivity jumped 25 percent the first year and 35 percent more the second. A 1991 Forest Service study indicated that the experiment had succeeded in bringing gains in efficiency, productivity, and morale, but had failed to provide the Forest Service region with a mechanism for complying with congressional intent. After 3 years of negotiations, Washington and Region 6, where the Ochoco Forest is located, couldn't agree. The region wanted to retain the initial emphasis on performance goals and targets so forest managers could shift money from one account to another if they met performance goals and targets. Washington argued that Congress would not regard such targets as a serious measure of congressional intent. The experiment ended in March 1993.17 When the Defense Department allowed several military bases to experiment with what was called the Unified Budget Test, base commanders estimated that they could accomplish their missions with up to 10 percent less money. If this experience could be applied to the entire government, it could mean huge savings. Beginning with their fiscal year 1995 submissions to OMB, departments and agencies will begin consolidating accounts to minimize restrictions and manage more effectively. They will radically cut the number of allotments used to subdivide accounts. In addition, they will consider using the Defense Department's Unified Budget plan, which permits shifts in funds between allotments and cost categories to help accomplish missions. OMB will simplify the apportionment process, which hamstrings agencies by dividing their funding into amounts that are available, bit by bit, according to specified time periods, activities, or projects. Agencies often don't get their funding on time and, after they do, must fill out reams of paperwork to show that they adhered to apportionment guidelines. OMB will also expedite the "reprogramming" process, by which agencies can move funds within congressionally appropriated accounts. Currently, OMB and congressional subcommittees approve all such reprogrammings. OMB should automatically approve reprogramming unless it objects within a set period, such as five days. While understandable in some cases, such earmarks hamper agencies that seek to manage programs efficiently. Agencies should work with appropriations subcommittees on this problem. ACTION: OMB and agencies will stop using full-time equivalent ceilings, managing and budgeting instead with ceilings on operating costs to control spending.18 In another effort to control spending, both the executive and legislative branches often limit the number of each agency's employees by using full-time equivalent (FTE) limits. When agencies prepare their budget estimates, they must state how many FTEs they need in addition to how many dollars. Then, each department or agency divides that number into a ceiling for each bureau, division, branch, or other unit. Congress occasionally complicates the situation by legislating FTE floors. Federal managers often cite FTE controls as the single most oppressive restriction on their ability to manage. Under the existing system, FTE controls are the only way to make good on the President's commitment to reduce the federal bureaucracy by 100,000 positions through attrition. But as we redesign the government for greater accountability, we need to use budgets, rather than FTE controls, to drive our downsizing. FTE ceilings are usually imposed independently of--and often conflict with-- budget allocations. They are frequently arbitrary, rarely account for changing circumstances, and are normally imposed as across- the-board percentage cuts in FTEs for all of an agency's units-- regardless of changing circumstances. Organizations that face new regulations or a greater workload don't get new FTE ceilings. Consequently, they must contract out work that could be done better and cheaper in-house. One manager at Vice President Gore's meeting with foreign affairs community employees at the State Department in May 1993 offered an example: his FTE limit had forced him to contract out for a junior programmer for the Foreign Service Institute. As it turned out, the programmer's hourly rate equaled the Institute Director's, so the move cost money instead of saving it. The President should direct OMB and agency heads to stop setting FTE ceilings in fiscal year 1995. For this transition, the agencies' accounting systems will have to separate true operating costs from program and other costs. Some agencies already have such systems in place; others must develop financial management systems to allow them to calculate these costs. We address this issue in a separate recommendation in chapter 3. This recommendation fully supports the President's commitment to maintain a reduced federal workforce. Instead of controlling the size of the federal workforce by employment ceilings--which cause inefficiencies and distortions in managers' personnel and resource allocation decisions--this new system will control the federal workforce by dollars available in operating funds. ACTION: Minimize congressional restrictions such as line items, earmarks, and eliminate FTE floors.19 Congress should also minimize the restrictions and earmarks that it imposes on agencies. With virtually all federal spending under scrutiny for future cuts, Congress is increasingly applying earmarks to ensure that funding flows to favored programs and hometown projects. Imagine the surprise of Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt, who a few months after taking office discovered that he was under orders from Congress to maintain 23 positions in the Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, field office of his department's anthracite reclamation program. Or that his department was required to spend $100,000 to train beagles in Hawaii to sniff out brown tree snakes. Edward Derwinski, former secretary of Veteran Affairs, was once summoned before the Texas congressional delegation to explain his plan to eliminate 38 jobs in that state.20 ACTION: Allow agencies to roll over 50 percent of what they do not spend on internal operations during a fiscal year.21 As part of its 13 fiscal year 1995 appropriations bills, Congress should permanently allow agencies to roll over 50 percent of unobligated year-end balances in all appropriations for operations. It should allow agencies to use up to 2 percent of rolled-over funds to finance bonuses for employees involved. This approach, which the Defense Department and Forest Service have used successfully, would reward employees for finding more productive ways to work. Moreover, it would create incentives to save the taxpayers' money. Shared savings incentives work. In 1989, the General Accounting Office (GAO) discovered that the Veterans Administration had not recovered $223 million in health payments from third parties, such as insurers. Congress then changed the rules, allowing the VA to hire more staff to keep up with the paperwork and also to keep a portion of recovered third-party payments for administrative costs. VA recoveries soared from $24 million to $530 million.22 If incentives to save are to be real, Congress and OMB will have to refrain from automatically cutting agencies' budgets by the amount they have saved when they next budget is prepared. Policy decisions to cut spending are one thing; automatic cuts to take back savings are quite another. They simply confirm managers' fears that they will be penalized for saving money. Agencies' chief financial officers should intervene in the budget process to ensure that this does not happen. FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS CHAPTER 1: CUTTING RED TAPE STEP 2: DECENTRALIZING PERSONNEL POLICY Our federal personnel system has been evolving for more than 100 years--ever since the 1881 assassination of President James A. Garfield by a disappointed job seeker. And during that time, according to a 1988 Office of Personnel Management publication: ...anecdotal mistakes prompted additional rules. When the rules led to new inequities, even more rules were added. Over time...a maze of regulations and requirements was created, hamstringing managers...often impeding federal managers and employees from achieving their missions and from giving the public a high quality of service. Year after year, layer after layer, the rules have piled up. The U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board reports there are now 850 pages of federal personnel law--augmented by 1,300 pages of OPM regulations on how to implement those laws and another 10,000 pages of guidelines from the Federal Personnel Manual. ______________________________________________________________________ | CATCH-22 | | | | Our federal personnel system ought to place a value on experience. | | That's not always the case. Consider the story of Rosalie Tapia. | | Ten years ago, fresh from high school, she joined the Army and was | | assigned to Germany as a clerk. She served out her enlistment with | | an excellent record, landed a job in Germany as a civilian | | secretary for the Army, and worked her way up to assistant to the | | division chief. When the Cold War ended, Tapia wanted to return to | | the U.S. and transfer to a government job here. Unfortunately, one | | of the dictates contained in the government's 10,000 pages of | | personnel rules says that an employee hired as a civil servant | | overseas is not considered a government employee once on home | | soil. Any smart employer would prefer to hire an experienced | | worker with an excellent service record over an unknown. But our | | government's policy doesn't make it easy. Ironically, Tapia landed | | a job with a government contractor, making more money--and | | probably costing taxpayers more--than a job in the bureaucracy | | would have paid. | ______________________________________________________________________ On one topic alone--how to complete a standard form for a notice of a personnel action--the Federal Personnel Manual contains 900 pages of instructions. The full stack of personnel laws, regulations, directives, case law and departmental guidance that the Agriculture Department uses weighs 1,088 pounds. Thousands of pages of personnel rules prompt thousands of pages of personnel forms. In 1991, for example, the Navy's Human Resources Office processed enough forms to create a "monument" 3,100 feet tall--six times the height of the Washington monument. Costs to the taxpayer for this personnel quagmire are enormous. In total, 54,000 personnel work in federal personnel positions.23 We spend billions of dollars for these staff to classify each employee within a highly complex system of some 459 job series, 15 grades and 10 steps within each grade. Does this elaborate system work? No. After surveying managers, supervisors and personnel officers in a number of federal agencies, the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board recently concluded that federal personnel rules are too complex, too prescriptive, and often counterproductive. Talk to a federal manager for 10 minutes: You likely will hear at least one personnel horror story. The system is so complex and rule-bound that most managers cannot even advise an applicant how to get a federal job. "Even when the public sector finds outstanding candidates," In 1989, Paul Volcker's National Commission on the Public Service explained, "the complexity of the hiring process often drives all but the most dedicated away." Managers who find it nearly impossible to hire the people they need sometimes flaunt the system by hiring people as consultants at higher rates than those same people would earn as federal employees. The average manager needs a year to fire an incompetent employee, even with solid proof. During layoffs, employees slated to be laid off can "bump" employees with less seniority, regardless of their abilities or performance--putting people in jobs they don't understand and never wanted. Vice President Gore heard many stories of dissatisfaction as he listened to federal workers at meetings in their agencies. A supervisor at the Centers for Disease Control complained that it can take six to eight months and as many as 15 revisions to a job description in order to get approval for a position he needs to fill. A secretary from the Justice Department told the Vice President she was discouraged and overworked in an office where some secretaries were slacking off--with no system in place to reward the hard workers and take action against the slackers. A worker from the Agency for International Development expressed her frustration at being so narrowly "slotted" in a particular GS series that she wasn't allowed to apply for a job in a slightly different GS series--even though she was qualified for the job. An Air Force lieutenant colonel told the vice president that her secretary was abandoning government for the private sector because she was blocked from any more promotions in her current job series. The loss would be enormous, the colonel told Gore, because her secretary was her "right-hand person". One of the Labor Department's regional directors for unemployment insurance complained that even though he is charged with running a multimillion a year program, he isn't allowed to hire a $45,000-a- year program specialist without getting approval from Washington. To create an effective federal government, we must reform virtually the entire personnel system: recruitment, hiring, classification, promotion, pay, and reward systems. We must make it easier for federal managers to hire the workers they need, to reward those who do good work, and to fire those who do not. As the National Academy of Public Administration concluded in 1993, "It is not a question of whether the federal government should change how it manages its human resources. It must change." ACTION: OPM will deregulate personnel policy by phasing out the 10,000-page Federal Personnel Manual and all agency implementing directives.24 We must enable all managers to pursue their missions, freed from the cumbersome red tape of current personnel rules. The President should issue a directive phasing out the Federal Personnel Manual and all agency implementing directives. The order will require that most personnel management authority be delegated to agencies' line managers at the lowest level practical in each agency. It will direct OPM to work with agencies to determine which FPM chapters, provisions, or supplements are essential, which are useful, and which are unnecessary. OPM will then replace the FPM and agency directives with manuals tailored to user needs, automated personnel processes, and electronic decision support systems. Once some of the paperwork burden is eased, our next priority must be to give agency managers more control over who comes to work for them. To accomplish this, we propose to radically decentralize the government's hiring process. ACTION: Give all departments and agencies authority to conduct their own recruiting and examining for all positions, and abolish all central registers and standard application forms.25 We will ask Congress to pass legislation decentralizing authority over recruitment, hiring, and promotion. Under the present system, OPM controls the examination system for external candidates and recruits and screens candidates for positions that are common to all agencies, with agencies then hiring from among candidates presented by OPM. Under the new system, OPM could offer to screen candidates for agencies, but agencies need not accept OPM's offer. Under this decentralized system, agencies will also be allowed to make their own decisions about when to hire candidates directly-- without examinations or rankings--under guidelines to be drafted by OPM. Agencies able to do so should also be permitted to conduct their own background investigations of potential candidates. We will make sure the system is fair and easy for job applicants to use, however, by making information about federal job openings available in one place. In place of a central register, OPM will create a government-wide, employment information system that allows the public to go to one place for information about all job opportunities in the federal government. ______________________________________________________________________ | First, we must cut the waste and make government operations more | | responsive to the American people. It is time to shift from top- | | down bureaucracy to entrepreneurial government that generates | | change from the bottom up. We must reward the people and ideas | | that work and get rid of those that don't. | | | | President Bill Clinton | | February 17, 1993 | ______________________________________________________________________ Next, we must change the classification system, introduced in 1949 to create fairness across agencies but now widely regarded as time-consuming, expensive, cumbersome, and intensely frustrating-- for both workers and managers. After an exhaustive 1991 study of the system, the National Academy of Public Administration recommended a complete overhaul of the system. Classification standards, NAPA argued, are "too complex, inflexible, out-of-date, and inaccurate," creating "rigid job hierarchies that cannot change with organizational structure." They drive some of the best employees out of their fields of expertise and into management positions, for higher pay. And managers seeking to create new positions often fight the system for months to get them classified and filled.26 There is strong evidence that agencies given authority to do these things themselves can do better. Using demonstration authority under the 1978 Civil Service Reform Act, several agencies have experimented with simpler systems. In one experiment, at the Naval Weapons Center in China Lake, California, and the Naval Oceans Systems Center, in San Diego, the system was simplified to a few career paths and only four-to-six broad pay bands within each path. Known as the "China Lake Experiment," it solved many of the problems faced by the two naval facilities. It: * classified all jobs in just five career paths--professional, technical, specialist, administrative and clerical; * folded all GS (General Schedule) grades into four, five, or six pay bands within each career path; * allowed managers to pay market salaries to recruit people, to increase the pay of outstanding employees without having to reclassify them, and to give performance-based bonuses and salary increases; * automatically moved employees with repeated marginal performance evaluations down to the next pay band; and * limited bumping to one career path, and based it primarily on performance ratings, not seniority. Another demonstration at McClellan Air Force Base, in Sacramento, California, involved "gainsharing"--allowing employees to pocket some of the savings they achieved through cooperative labor- management efforts to cut costs. It generated $5 million in productivity savings in four years and saw improved employee performance; fewer grievances; less sick leave and absenteeism; and improved labor-management relations. A third demonstration at more than 200 Agriculture Department sites tested a streamlined, agency-based recruiting and hiring system that replaced OPM's register process. Under OPM's system, candidates are arrayed and scored based on OPM's written tests or other examinations. In USDA's demonstration, however, the agency grouped candidates by its own criteria, such as education, experience or ability, then picked from those candidates. A candidate might qualify for a job, for example, with a 2.7 college grade point average. Agencies could create their own recruitment incentives, do their own hiring, and extend the probationary period for some new hires. Managers were far more satisfied with this system than the existing one. ACTION: Dramatically simplify the current classification system, to give agencies greater flexibility in how they classify and pay their employees.27 We will urge Congress to remove all the 1940s-era grade-level descriptions from the law and adopt an approach that is more modern. In addition, Congress should allow agencies to move from the General Schedule system to a broad-band system. OPM should develop such standard banding patterns, and agencies should be free to adopt one without seeking OPM's approval. When agency proposals do not fit under a standard pattern, OPM should approve them as five-year demonstration projects that would be converted to permanent "alternative systems" if successful. OPM should establish criteria for broad-banding demonstration projects, and agencies' projects meeting those criteria should receive automatic approval. These changes would give agencies greater flexibility to hire, retain, and promote the best people they find. They would help agencies flatten their hierarchies and promote high achievers without having to make them supervisors. They would eliminate much valuable time now lost to battles between managers seeking to promote or reward employees and personnel specialists administering a classification system with rigid limits. Finally, they would remove OPM from its role as "classification police." To accompany agencies' new flexibility on classification and pay, they must also be given authority to set standards for their own workers and to reward those who do well. ACTION: Agencies should be allowed to design their own performance management and reward systems, with the objective of improving the performance of individuals and organizations. 28 The current government performance appraisal process is frequently criticized as a meaningless exercise in which most federal employees are given above-average ratings. We believe that agencies will be able to develop performance appraisals that are more meaningful to their employees. If they succeed, these new approaches will send a message that job performance is directly linked to workers' chances for promotion and higher pay. Current systems to assess on-the-job performance were designed to serve multiple purposes: to enhance performance, to authorize higher pay for high performers, to retain high performers, and to promote staff development. Not surprisingly, they serve none of these purposes well. Performance management programs should have a single goal: to improve the performance of individuals and organizations. Agencies should be allowed to develop programs that meet their needs and reflect their cultures, including incentive programs, gainsharing programs, and awards that link pay and performance. If agencies-- in cooperation with employees--design their own systems, managers and employees alike should feel more ownership of them. Finally, if performance measures are to be taken seriously, managers must have authority to fire workers who do not measure up. It is possible to fire a poor worker in the federal government, but it takes far too long. We believe this undermines good management and diminishes workers' incentives to improve. ACTION: Reduce by half the time required to terminate federal managers and employees for cause and improve the system for dealing with poor performers.29 Agencies will reduce the time for terminating employees for cause by half. For example, agencies could halve the length of time during which managers and employees with unsatisfactory performance ratings are allowed to demonstrate improved performance. To support this effort, we will ask OPM to draft and Congress to pass legislation to change the required time for notice of termination from 30 to 15 days. This legislation should also require the waiting period for a within-grade increase to be extended by the amount of time an employee's performance does not meet expectations. In other words, only the time that an employee is doing satisfactory work should be credited toward the required waiting period for a pay raise. FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS CHAPTER 1: CUTTING RED TAPE STEP 3: STREAMLINING PROCUREMENT Every year, Washington spends about $200 billion buying goods and services. That's $800 per American. With a price tag like that, taxpayers have a right t Our system relies on rigid rules and procedures, extensive paperwork, detailed design specifications, and multiple inspections and audits. It is an extraordinary example of bureaucratic red tape.ore pages of agency-specific supplements. These numbers document what most federal workers and many taxpayers already know: Our system relies on rigid rules and procedures, extensive paperwork, detailed design specifications, and multiple inspections and audits. It is an extraordinary example of bureaucratic red tape. Like the budget and personnel systems, the procurement system was designed with the best of intentions. To prevent profiteering and fraud, it includes rigid safeguards. To take advantage of bulk purchasing, it is highly centralized. But the government wrote its procurement rules when retailing was highly stratified, with many markups by intermediaries. Today the game has changed considerably. Retail giants like Wal-Mart, Office Depot and Price Club are vertically integrated, eliminating the markups of intermediaries. Federal managers can buy 90 percent of what they need over the phone, from mail-order discounters. Bulk purchasing still has its advantages, but it is not always necessary to get the best price. Our overly centralized purchasing system takes decisions away from managers who know what they need, and allows strangers--often thousands of miles away--to make purchasing decisions. The frequent result: Procurement officers, who make their own decisions about what to buy and how soon to buy it, purchase low- quality items, or even the wrong ones, that arrive too late. This "secondhand" approach to purchasing creates another problem. When line managers' needs and experiences are not understood by the procurement officer, the government is unable to make decisions that reward good vendors and punish bad ones. As a result, vendors often "game" contracts--exploiting loopholes to require expensive changes. For example, in a major government contract for a computerized data network a few years ago, a vendor used slight underestimates of system demand in the contract specifications as an excuse to charge exorbitant prices for system upgrades. In the private sector, a manager could have used the incentive of future contracts to prevent such gaming; in the government, there is no such leverage. The symptoms of what's wrong are apparent, too, from stories about small purchases. One story that Vice President Gore has repeated in Washington over the past six months concerns steam traps. Steam traps remove condensation from steam lines in heating systems. Each costs about $100. But when one breaks, it leaks as much as $50 of steam a week. Obviously, a leaking steam trap should be replaced quickly. When plumbers at the Sacramento Army Depot found leaking traps, however, their manager followed standard operating procedure. He called the procurement office, where an officer, who knew nothing about steam traps, followed common practice. He waited for enough orders to buy in bulk, saving the government about $10 per trap. There was no rule requiring him to wait--just a powerful tradition. So the Sacramento Depot didn't get new steam traps for a year. In the meantime, each of their leaking traps spewed $2,500 of steam. To save $10, the central procurement system wasted $2,500. As the Vice President visited government agencies, he heard many more stories of wasteful spending--most of them produced by the very rules we have designed to prevent it. Take the case of government travel. Because GSA selects a "contract airline" for each route, federal employees have few choices. If Northwest has the Washington-Tampa route, for instance, federal employees get routed through Detroit. If Northwest has the Boston-Washington route, employees have to use Northwest--even if USAir has more frequent flights at more convenient times. Workers told the Vice President of being routed through thousands of miles out of their way even if it cost them a day's worth of time--and a day's worth of taxpayers' money. Others told of being unable to take advantage of cheap "special fares" because they were not "government fares." And one worker showed the National Performance Review a memo from the Resolution Trust Corporation explaining that RTC workers would not be reimbursed for any travel expenses unless they signed their travel vouchers in blue ink! ______________________________________________________________________ | "Ash receivers, tobacco (desk type)..." | | | | Our federal procurement system leaves little to chance. When the | | General Services Administration wanted to buy ashtrays, it has | | some very specific ideas how those ashtrays--better known to GSA | | as "ash receivers, tobacco (desk type)," should be constructed. | | | | In March 1993, the GSA outlined, in nine full pages of | | specifications and drawings, the precise dimensions, color, polish | | and markings required for simple glass ashtrays that would pass | | U.S. government standards. | | | | A Type I, glass, square, 41/2 inch (114.3 mm) ash receiver must | | include several features: "A minimum of four cigarette rests, | | spaced equidistant around the periphery and aimed at the center of | | the receiver, molded into the top. The cigarette rests shall be | | sloped toward the center of the ash receiver. The rests shall be | | parallel to the outside top edge of the receiver or in each | | corner, at the manufacturer's option. All surfaces shall be | | smooth." | | | | Government ashtrays must be sturdy too. To guard against the | | purchase of defective ash receivers, the GSA required that all | | ashtrays be tested. "The test shall be made by placing the | | specimen on its base upon a solid support (a 1 3/4 inch, 44.5mm | | maple plank), placing a steel center punch (point ground to a 60- | | degree included angle) in contact with the center of the inside | | surface of the bottom and striking with a hammer in successive | | blows of increasing severity until breakage occurs." Then, | | according to paragraph 4.5.2., "The specimen should break into a | | small number of irregular shaped pieces not greater in number than | | 35, and it must not dice." What does "dice" mean? The paragraph | | goes on to explain: "Any piece 1/4 inch (6.4 mm) or more on any | | three of its adjacent edges (excluding the thickness dimension) | | shall be included in the number counted. Smaller fragments shall | | not be counted." | | | | Regulation AA-A-710E, (superseding Regulation AA-A-710D). | ______________________________________________________________________ Beyond travel, at every federal agency the Vice President visited, employees told stories about not getting supplies and equipment they needed, getting them late, or watching the government spend too much for them. At the Department of Health and Human Services, a worker told the Vice President that no matter how much his office needed a FAX machine--and how much time the machine would save workers--the purchase wouldn't be possible "without the signature of everyone in this room." An engineer from the National Institutes of Health added that in his agency, it takes more than a year to buy a computer, not a mainframe, but a personal computer! At the Transportation Department, a hearing-impaired employee told the Vice President of watching with dismay as her agency spent $600 to buy her a Telephone Device for the Deaf (TDD), when she knew she could buy one off the shelf for $300. Anecdotes like these were documented in January 1993, when the Office of Federal Procurement Policy and the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board collaborated on a survey of the procurement system's customers: federal managers. More than 1,000 responded. Their message: The system is not achieving what its customers want. It ignores its customers' needs, pays higher prices than necessary, is filled with peripheral objectives, and assumes that line managers cannot be trusted. A study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies added several other conclusions. The procurement system adds costs without adding value; it impedes government's access to state-of-the-art commercial technology; and its complexity forces businesses to alter standard procedures and raise prices when dealing with the government.31 There is little disagreement that federal procurement must be reconfigured. We must radically decentralize authority to line managers, letting them buy much of what they need. We must radically simplify procurement regulations and processes. We must empower the system's customers by ending most government service monopolies, including those of the General Services Administration. As we detailed in Chapter 1, we must make the system competitive by allowing managers to use any procurement office that meets their needs. As we take these actions, we must embrace these fundamental principles: integrity, accountability, professionalism, openness, competition--and value. ACTION: Simplify the procurement process by rewriting federal regulations--shifting from rigid rules to guiding principles.32 The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), the government's principal set of procurement regulations, contains too many rules. Rules are changed too often and are so process-oriented that they minimize discretion and stifle innovation, according to a Merit Systems Protection Board survey.33 As one frustrated manager noted, the FAR does not even clearly state the main goal of procurement policy: "Is it to avoid waste, fraud, and abuse? Is it to implement a social-economic agenda? Is it to procure the government's requirements at a fair and reasonable cost?" This administration will rewrite the 1,600-page FAR, the 2,900 pages of agency supplements that accompany it, and Executive Order 12352, which governs federal procurement. The new regulations will: * shift from rigid rules to guiding principles; * promote decision making at the lowest possible level; * end unnecessary regulatory requirements; * foster competitiveness and commercial practices; * shift to a new emphasis on choosing "best value" products; * facilitate innovative contracting approaches; and * recommend acquisition methods that reflect information technology's short life cycle. * develop a more effective process to listen to its customers: line managers, government procurement officers and vendors who do business with the government. ACTION: The GSA will significantly increase its delegated authority to federal agencies for the purchase of information technology, including hardware, software, and services.34 In 1965, when "automated data processing" meant large, mainframe computers--often developed specifically for one customer--Congress passed the Brooks Act. It directed GSA to purchase, lease, and maintain such equipment for the entire federal government. The Act also gave GSA authority to delegate to agencies these same authorities. In 1986, Congress extended the requirement to software and support services. Today, with most computer equipment commercially available in highly competitive markets, the advantages of centralized purchasing have faded and the disadvantages grown. The federal government takes, on average, more than four years to buy major information technology systems; the private sector takes 13 months. Due to rapidly changing technology, the government often buys computers that are state-of-the-art when the purchase process begins and when prices are negotiated, but which are almost obsolete when computers are delivered. The phenomenon is what one observer calls "getting a 286 at a 486 price." Currently, the GSA authorizes agencies to make individual purchases up to $2.5 million in equipment and services on their own. The GSA Administrator will raise authorization levels to $50 million, $20 million and $5 million. These levels will be calculated according to each agency's size, the size of its information technology budget, and its management record. In some cases, GSA may grant an agency greater or unlimited delegation. GSA will also waive requirements that agencies justify their decisions to buy information technology items under $500,000 that are mass-produced and offered on the open market. ACTION: GSA will simplify the procurement process by allowing agencies to buy where they want, and testing a fully "electronic marketplace." 35 The government buys everything from forklifts and snowplows to flak jackets and test tubes through a system called the Multiple Award Schedule program, which includes more than one million separate items. Under this program, GSA negotiates and awards contracts to multiple vendors of comparable products and services, at varying prices. GSA then creates a "supply schedule" for a particular good or service, identifying all vendors that have won contracts as well as the negotiated prices. Of GSA's 154 schedules, civilian agencies must must buy from 117. In ordering from schedules, agencies still must comply--in addition--with the Federal Acquisition Regulation, Federal Information Resources Management Regulation, and Federal Property Management Regulation. In most cases, we should not limit managers to items on the supply schedules. If they can find the same or a comparable product for less, they should be free to buy it. Mandatory schedules should apply only when required by law, to ensure standardization, or when agencies voluntarily create team pools that buy in bulk for lower prices. In addition, GSA should revise regulations that currently limit agencies from buying more than $300,000 of information technology items on supply schedules, raise them to $500,000 and provide a higher limit for individual items costing more than $500,000. To make supply schedules more user-friendly, GSA should conduct several pilot tests. One should test an "electronic marketplace," in which GSA would not negotiate prices. Instead, suppliers would list products and prices electronically, and agencies would electronically order the lowest-priced item that met their needs. Suppliers, at any time, would be able to add new products and change prices. Such a pilot would test whether visible price competition will cut prices and give line managers easier access to rapidly changing products. ACTION: Allow agencies to make purchases under $100,000 through simplified purchase procedures.36 Under current law, agencies are allowed to make purchases of less than $25,000 on their own, using simple procurement procedures. These small purchases, on average, take less than a month to complete; purchases of more than $25,000 normally take more than three months. If Congress raised the threshold to $100,000, agencies could use simplified procedures on another 45,550 procurements--with a total value of $2.5 billion. Congress should keep current rules that reserve small purchases